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ABSTRACT
Persuasion studies how an informed principal may influence the behavior of agents by the strate-
gic provision of payoff-relevant information. We focus on the fundamental multi-receiver model
by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), in which there are no inter-agent externalities. Unlike prior works
on this problem, we study the public persuasion problem in the general setting with: (i) arbitrary
state spaces; (ii) arbitrary action spaces; (iii) arbitrary sender’s utility functions. We fully charac-
terize the computational complexity of computing a bi-criteria approximation of an optimal public
signaling scheme. In particular, we show, in a voting setting of independent interest, that solving this
problem requires at least a quasi-polynomial number of steps even in settings with a binary action
space, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis. In doing so, we prove that a relaxed version
of the MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SUBSYSTEM OF LINEAR INEQUALITIES problem requires at least
quasi-polynomial time to be solved. Finally, we close the gap by providing a quasi-polynomial time
bi-criteria approximation algorithm for arbitrary public persuasion problems that, in specific settings,
yields a QPTAS.
1 Introduction
Information structure design studies how to shape agents’ beliefs in order to achieve a desired outcome. When in-
formation is incomplete, the information structure determines “who knows what” about the parameters determining
payoff functions. There has been a recent surge of interest in the study of how an informed principal may influence
agents’ collective behavior toward a favorable outcome, via the strategic provision of payoff-relevant information. The
prescriptive problems arising in such setting are often termed persuasion or signaling. The study of these problems
has been driven by their application in domains such as auctions and online advertisement (Badanidiyuru et al., 2018;
Miltersen and Sheffet, 2012; Emek et al., 2014), voting (Alonso and Câmara, 2016; Cheng et al., 2015), traffic rout-
ing (Bhaskar et al., 2016; Vasserman et al., 2015), recommendation systems (Mansour et al., 2016), security (Xu et al.,
2015, 2016; Rabinovich et al., 2015), and product marketing (Babichenko and Barman, 2017; Candogan, 2019).
Persuasion is the task faced by an informed principal—the sender—, trying to influence the behavior of the self-
interested agent(s) in the game—the receiver(s). Such a sender faces the algorithmic problem of determining the
optimal information structure to further her own objectives. This is typically modeled through the selection of a sig-
naling scheme, which maps the sender’s parameters observations to distributions over possible signals. A foundational
model describing the persuasion problem is the Bayesian persuasion framework (BP) by Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). Here, there is a sender and a single receiver. The parameters determining the payoff functions are collectively
termed the state of nature, and model exogenous stochasticity in the environment. Their prior distribution is known
to both the sender and the receiver, but the sender observes the realized state of the environment, originating a fun-
damental asymmetry in the information available to the two agents. The prior distribution and the sender’s signaling
scheme determine the receiver equilibrium behavior. The model assumes the sender’s commitment, which is a natural
assumption in many settings (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Dughmi, 2017). One argument to that effect is that
reputation and credibility may be a key factor for the long-term utility of the sender (Rayo and Segal, 2010).
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In practice, the sender may need to persuademultiple receivers, revealing information to each of them. In the multiple-
receiver setting, the sender may employ either private or public signaling schemes. In the former setting, the sender
may reveal different information to each receiver through private communication channels. In the latter, which is the
focus of this paper, the sender has to reveal the same information to all receivers. Public persuasion is well suited
for settings where private communication channels are either too costly or impractical (e.g., settings with a large
population of receivers, such as voting), and settings where receivers may share private information with each other,
which frequently happens in practice.
This paper adopts and generalizes the multi-agent persuasion model by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), which rules out
the possibility of inter-agent externalities. Specifically, each receiver’s utility depends only on her own action and
the realized state of nature, but not on the actions of other receivers. This assumption allows one to focus on the key
problem of coordinating the receivers’ behaviors, without the additional complexity arising from externalities, which
have been shown to make the problem largely intractable (Bhaskar et al., 2016; Rubinstein, 2015). Our paper is the
first, to the best of our knowledge, focusing on public persuasion with no inter-agent externalities and: (i) an arbitrary
space of states of nature; (ii) arbitrary receivers’ action spaces; (iii) arbitrary sender’s utility function. Previous works
on Arieli and Babichenko (2019)’s model either address the private persuasion setting (Arieli and Babichenko, 2019;
Babichenko and Barman, 2016; Dughmi and Xu, 2017), or make some structural assumptions which render them spe-
cial cases of our model (Xu, 2019).
1.1 Context: Persuasion with Multiple Receivers
Dughmi and Xu (2016) analyze for the first time Bayesian persuasion from a computational perspective, focusing on
the single receiver case. Arieli and Babichenko (2019) introduce the model of persuasion with no inter-agent external-
ities. The authors study the setting with binary actions and state spaces, providing a characterization of the optimal
signaling scheme in the case of supermodular, anonymous submodular, and supermajority sender’s utility functions.
Babichenko and Barman (2016) provide a tight 1 − 1/e approximate signaling scheme for monotone submodular
sender’s utilities and show that an optimal private scheme for anonymous utility functions can be found efficiently.
Dughmi and Xu (2017) generalize the previous model to the case of many states of nature.
Various works study public persuasion, showing that designing public signaling schemes is usually harder than with
private communication channels. Bhaskar et al. (2016) and Rubinstein (2015) study public signaling problems in
which two receivers play a zero-sum game. In particular, Bhaskar et al. (2016) rule out an additive PTAS assuming
the planted-clique hardness. Moreover, Rubinstein (2015) proves that, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis
(ETH), computing an ǫ-optimal signaling scheme requires at least quasi-polynomial time. This result is tight due to
the quasi-polynomial approximation scheme by Cheng et al. (2015).
A number of previous works focus on the public signaling problem in the no inter-agent externalities framework
by Arieli and Babichenko (2019). Dughmi and Xu (2017) rule out the existence of a PTAS even when receivers have
binary action spaces, and objectives are linear, unless P = NP. For this reason, most of the works focus on the
computation of bi-criteria approximations in which the persuasion constraints can be violated by a small amount.
Cheng et al. (2015) present a polynomial-time bi-criteria approximation algorithm for voting scenarios. Xu (2019)
studies public persuasion with binary action spaces and proposes a PTAS with a bi-criteria guarantee for monotone
submodular sender’s utility functions. Moreover, Xu (2019) also provides, under a non-degenerate assumption, a
polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal signaling scheme when the number of states of nature is fixed.
1.2 Our Results and Techniques
The main result of the paper is providing a tight characterization of the complexity of computing bi-criteria approxima-
tions of optimal public signaling schemes in arbitrary persuasion problems with no inter-agent externalities. Previous
works on the same model exploit specific structures of the sender’s utility functions to provide polynomial-time al-
gorithms. Our main result is negative, showing that restricting the space of possible sender’s utility functions is a
necessary condition to design polynomial-time bi-criteria approximation algorithms. More precisely, the following
result shows that it is unlikely that there exists a bi-criteria polynomial-time approximation algorithm even in simple
settings with binary action spaces.
Corollary 1. Assuming ETH, there exists a constant ǫ∗ such that, for any ǫ ≤ ǫ∗, finding a signaling scheme that is
ǫ-persuasive and α-approximate requires time nΩ˜(logn) for any multiplicative or additive factor α, even for binary
action spaces.
The proof of this result requires an intermediate step that is of independent interest and of general applicability. Specif-
ically, we focus on a slight variation of the MAXIMUM FEASIBLE SUBSYSTEM OF LINEAR INEQUALITIES problem
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(ǫ-MFS) (Cheng et al., 2015), where, given a linear system Ax ≥ 0, A ∈ [−1, 1]nrow×ncol , we look for the vector
x ∈ ∆ncol almost (i.e., except for an additive factor ǫ) satisfying the highest number of inequalities (Definition 3). This
is a constrained version of the MAX FLS problem previously studied by Amaldi and Kann (1995), and it is commonly
used in scheduling (Daskalakis et al., 2014), signaling, and mechanism design (Cheng et al., 2015). Assuming ETH,
we prove that solving ǫ-MFS requires at least a quasi-polynomial number of steps via a reduction from two-provers
games (Aaronson et al., 2014; Deligkas et al., 2016) (Section 3.1).
Then, we focus on a simple public persuasion problem where receivers are voters, and they have a binary action space
since they must choose one between two candidates. We prove an hardness result (Theorem 6) for this setting which
directly implies Corollary 1. We show that the ǫ-MFS problem is deeply connected to the problem of computing
“good” posteriors, as the choice of an optimal x in ǫ-MFS maps to the choice of an ǫ-persuasive posterior.
In order to design an approximation algorithm, we resort to the assumption of α-approximable utility functions for
the sender, as previously defined by Xu (2019). An α-approximable sender’s utility function is such that it is possible
to obtain in polynomial time a tie breaking for the receivers guaranteeing to the sender an α-approximation of the
optimal objective value. The request of α-approximability is natural since otherwise even the problem of evaluating
the sender’s objective for a given posterior over the states of nature would not be tractable. When the sender’s utility
function is α-approximable, there is no hope for a better approximation than an α-approximate signaling scheme.
The following result shows that it is possible to compute, in quasi-polynomial time, a bi-criteria approximation with
a factor arbitrarily close to α, i.e., the best factor that can be guaranteed on the objective value, and an arbitrary small
loss in persuasiveness.
Theorem 7. Assume f is α-approximate, there exists a poly
(
n
log(n/δ)
ǫ2
)
algorithm that outputs an α(1 − δ)-
approximate ǫ-persuasive public signaling scheme.
For 1-approximable functions, Theorem 7 yields a bi-criteria QPTAS. In the setting of Xu (2019) (i.e., binary action
spaces and state-independent sender’s utility function), our result automatically yields a QPTAS for any monotone
sender’s utility function. In order to prove the result, we show that any posterior can be represented as a convex
combination of k-uniform posteriors with only a small loss in the objective value. By restricting our attention to
the set of k-uniform posteriors, which has quasi-polynomial size, the problem can be solved via a linear program of
quasi-polynomial size.
2 Preliminaries
This section describes the instantiation of the Bayesian persuasion framework which is the focus of this work (Sec-
tion 2.1), public signaling problems (Section 2.2), the notion of bi-criteria approximation adopted (Section 2.3), and it
presents an explanatory application to voting problems (Section 2.4). For a comprehensive overview of the Bayesian
persuasion framework we refer the reader to Kamenica (2018); Bergemann and Morris (2019) and Dughmi (2017). 1
2.1 Basic Model
Our model is a generalization of the fundamental special case introduced by Arieli and Babichenko (2019), i.e., multi-
agent persuasion with no inter-agent externalities. We adopt the perspective of a sender facing a finite set of receivers
R := [n¯]. Each receiver r has a finite set of ̺r actions Ar := {ai}̺
r
i=1. Each receiver’s payoff depends only on her
own action and on a (random) state of nature θ, drawn from a finite set Θ := {θi}di=1 of cardinality d. In particular,
receiver r’s utility is specified by the function ur : Ar × Θ → [0, 1]. Each receiver’s utility does not depend on
other receivers’ actions for the no inter-agent externalities assumption Arieli and Babichenko (2019). We denote by
urθ(a
r) ∈ [0, 1] the utility observed by receiver r when the state of nature is θ and she plays ar. Let A := ×r∈RAr.
An action profile (i.e, a tuple specifying an action for each receiver) is denoted by a ∈ A. The sender’s utility, when
the state of nature is θ, is described via the function fθ : A → [0, 1]. We write fθ(a) to denote sender’s payoff when
receivers behave according to action profile a and the state of nature is θ. As customary in the BP literature, fθ is
represented implicitly for each θ (see Equation 3 for an example).
As it is customary in Bayesian persuasion, we assume θ is drawn from a common prior distribution µ ∈ int(∆Θ),
which is explicitly known to the sender and the receivers. Moreover, the sender can publicly commit to a policy φ
(i.e., a signaling scheme, see Section 2.2) which maps states of nature to signals for the receivers. A generic signal for
receiver r is denoted by sr. The interaction between the sender and the receivers goes as follows:
1 Throughout the paper, the set {1, . . . , x} is denoted by [x], int(X) is the interior of setX , and∆X is the set of all probability
distributions on X . The indicator function for the event E is denoted by I [E ]. Bold case letters denote column vectors. Moreover,
we generally denote the size of a problem input by n.
3
ARXIV PREPRINT - APRIL 1, 2020
1. the sender commits to a publicly known signaling scheme φ;
2. the sender observes the realized state of nature θ ∼ µ;
3. the sender draws (sr)n¯r=1 ∼ φθ and communicates to each receiver r the signal sr;
4. each receiver r observes sr and rationally updates her prior beliefs overΘ according to the Bayes rule. Then,
each receiver selects an action maximizing her expected reward.
Let a be the tuple of receivers’ choices. Each receiver r observes payoff urθ(a
r), and the sender observes payoff fθ(a).
2.2 Public Signaling Schemes
Each receiver r has a set Sr of available signals. A signal profile is a tuple s = (sr)n¯r=1 ∈ S specifying a signal for
each receiver, where S := ×r∈RSr. A public signaling scheme is a function φ : Θ → S mapping states of nature
to signal profiles, with the constraint that each receiver has to receive the same signal. With an overload of notation
we write s ∈ S for the public signal received by all receivers. The probability with which the sender selects s after
observing θ is denoted by φθ(s). Thus, it holds
∑
s∈S φθ(s) = 1 for each θ ∈ Θ. After observing s ∈ S, receiver
r performs a Bayesian update and infers a posterior belief p ∈ ∆Θ over the states of nature as follows: the realized
state of nature is θ with probability pθ := µθ φθ(s)/
∑
θ∈Θ µθ φθ(s). Since the prior is common and all receivers
observe the same s, they all perform the same Bayesian update and have the same posterior belief regarding the states
of nature. After forming p, each receiver solves a disjoint single-agent decision problem to find the action maximizing
her expected utility.
A signaling scheme is direct when signals can be mapped to actions of the receivers, and interpreted as action rec-
ommendations. Each receiver is sent a vector specifying a (possibly different) action for each other receiver, i.e., for
each r ∈ R, Sr = A. Moreover, a signaling scheme is persuasive if following the recommendations is an equilib-
rium of the underlying Bayesian game (Bergemann and Morris, 2016a,b). A direct signaling scheme is persuasive if
the sender’s action recommendation belongs to the set argmaxa∈Ar
∑
θ∈Θ pθ u
r
θ(a). A simple revelation-principle
style argument shows that there always exists an optimal public signaling scheme which is both direct and persua-
sive (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Arieli and Babichenko, 2019). A signal in a direct signaling scheme can be
equivalently expressed as an action profile a ∈ A. Therefore, there is an exponential number of such signals. We
write φθ(a) to denote the probability with which the sender selects s = a when the realized state of nature is θ. The
problem of determining an optimal public signaling scheme which is direct and persuasive can be formulated with the
following (exponentially sized) linear program (LP):
max
φ≥0
∑
θ∈Θ,a∈A
µθ φθ(a) fθ(a) (1a)
s.t.
∑
θ∈Θ
µθ φθ(a)
(
urθ(a
r)− urθ(a′)
)
≥ 0 ∀r ∈ R, ∀a ∈ A, a′ ∈ Ar (1b)
∑
a∈A
φθ(a) = 1 ∀θ ∈ Θ (1c)
The sender’s goal is computing the signaling scheme maximizing her expected utility (objective function 1a). Con-
straints 1b force the public signaling scheme to be persuasive.
2.3 Bi-criteria Approximation
We say that a public signaling scheme is ǫ-persuasive if the following holds for any r ∈ R, a ∈ A, and a′ ∈ Ar:∑
θ∈Θ
µθ φθ(a)
(
urθ(a
r)− urθ(a′)
)
≥ −ǫ. (2)
Throughout the paper, we focus on the computation of approximately optimal signaling schemes. Let OPT be the
optimal value of LP (1), i.e., the best sender’s expected revenue under public persuasion constraints. Since fθs are
non-negative functions, we have that OPT ≥ 0. When a signaling scheme yields an expected sender utility of at least
αOPT, with α ∈ (0, 1], we say that the signaling scheme is α-approximate. When a signaling scheme yields an
expected sender utility of at least OPT − α, with α ∈ [0, 1), we say that the scheme is α-optimal.
Finally, we consider approximations which relax both the optimality and the persuasiveness constraints. When a
signaling scheme is both ǫ-persuasive and α-approximate (or α-optimal), we say it is a bi-criteria approximation. We
say that one such signaling scheme is (α, ǫ)-persuasive.
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2.4 An Application: Persuasion In Voting Problems
In an election with a k-voting rule, candidates are elected if they receive at least k ∈ [n¯] votes. In this setting, a sender
(e.g., a politician or a lobbyist) may send signals to the voters on the basis of private information which is hidden from
them. After observing the sender’s signal, each voter (i.e., the receivers) chooses one among the set of candidates.
In the following, we will employ instances of k-voting in which receivers have to choose one between two candidates.
Then, they have a binary action space with actions a0 and a1 corresponding to the choice of the first and the second
candidate, respectively. Each receiver r has utility urθ(a) ∈ [0, 1] for each a ∈ {a0, a1}, θ ∈ Θ. The sender’s preferred
candidate is the one corresponding to action a0. Therefore, her objective is maximizing the probability that a0 receives
more than k votes. Formally, the sender’s utility function is such that fθ = f for each θ, and
f(a) :=
{
1 if |{r ∈ R : ar = a0}| ≥ k
0 otherwise
for each a ∈ A. (3)
Moreover, let W : ∆Θ → N+0 be a function returning, for a given posterior distribution p ∈ ∆Θ, the number
of receivers such that
∑
θ pθ (u
r
θ(a0) − urθ(a1)) ≥ 0. Analogously, Wǫ(p) is the number of receivers for which∑
θ pθ (u
r
θ(a0) − urθ(a1)) ≥ −ǫ. In the above setting, we refer to the problem of finding an ǫ-persuasive signaling
scheme which is also α-approximate (or α-optimal) as (α, ǫ)-k-voting. To further clarify this election scenario, we
provide the following simple example, by Castiglioni et al. (2019).
Example 1. There are three voters R = {1, 2, 3} who must select one between two candidates {a0, a1}. The sender
(e.g., a politician or a lobbyist) observes the realized state of nature, drawn from the uniform distribution over Θ =
{A,B,C}, and exploits this information to help a0 being elected. The state of nature describes the position of a0 on
a matter of particular interest to the voters. Moreover, all the voters have a slightly negative opinion of candidate a1,
independently of the state of nature. Table 1 describes the utility of the three voters.
State A State B State C
a0 a1 a0 a1 a0 a1
V
o
te
rs 1 +1 −1/4 −1 −1/4 −1 −1/4
2 −1 −1/4 +1 −1/4 −1 −1/4
3 −1 −1/4 −1 −1/4 +1 −1/4
Table 1: Payoffs from voting different candidates.
Signals
not A not B not C
S
ta
te
s A 0 1/2 1/2
B 1/2 0 1/2
C 1/2 1/2 0
Table 2: Optimal signaling scheme.
We consider a k-voting rule with k = 2. Without any form of signaling, all the voters would vote for a1 because it
provides an expected utility of −1/4, against −1/3. If the sender discloses all the information regarding the state of
nature (i.e., with a fully informative signal), he would still get 0 utility, since two out of three receivers would pick a1
in each of the possible states. However, the sender can design a public signaling scheme guaranteeing herself utility
1 for each state of nature. Table 2 describes one such scheme with arbitrary signals. Suppose the observed state is
A, and that the signal is not B. Then, the posterior distribution over the states of nature is (1/2, 0, 1/2). Therefore,
receiver 1 and receiver 3 would vote for a0 since their expected utility would be 0 against −1/4. Similarly, for any
other signal, two receivers vote for a0. Then, the sender’s expected payoff is 1. We can recover an equivalent direct
signaling scheme by sending a tuple with a candidates’ suggestion for each voter. For example, not A would become
(a1, a0, a0), and each voter would observe the recommendations given to the others.
3 Technical Toolkit
In this section, we describe some key results previously studied in the literature that we will exploit in the remainder
of the paper. In particular, we summarize some of the results on two-prover games by Babichenko et al. (2015)
and Deligkas et al. (2016) (Section 3.1), and we describe a useful Theorem on error-correcting codes by Gilbert (1952)
(Section 3.2).
3.1 Two-Provers Games
A two-prover game G is a co-operative game played by two players (Merlin1 and Merlin2, resp.), and an adjudicator
(verifier) called Arthur. At the beginning of the game, Arthur draws a pair of questions (x, y) ∈ X × Y according
to a probability distribution D over the joint set of questions (i.e., D ∈ ∆X×Y ). Merlin1 (resp., Merlin2) observes x
(resp., y) and chooses an answer ξ1 (resp., ξ2) from her finite set of answers Ξ1 (resp., Ξ2). Then, Arthur declares
the Merlins to have won with a probability equal to the value of a verification function V(x, y, ξ1, ξ2). A strategy for
5
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Merlin1 is a function η1 : X → Ξ1 mapping each possible question to an answer. Analogously, η2 : Y → Ξ2 is
a strategy of Merlin2. Before the beginning of the game, Merlin1 and Merlin2 can agree on their pair of (possibly
mixed) strategies (η1, η2), but no communication is allowed during the games. The payoff of a game G under (η1, η2)
is defined as: u(G, η1, η2) := E(x,y)∼D[V(x, y, η1(x), η2(y))] . The value of a two-prover game G, denoted by ω(G),
is the maximum expected payoff to the Merlins when they play optimally: ω(G) := maxη1 maxη2 u(G, η1, η2). The
size of the game is |G| = |X × Y × Ξ1 × Ξ2|.
A two-prover game is called a free game if D is a uniform distribution over X × Y . This implies that there is no
correlation between the questions sent to Merlin1 and Merlin2. It is possible to build a family of free games mapping
to 3SAT formula arising from Dinur’s PCP theorem. We say that the size n of a formula ϕ is the number of variables
plus the number of clauses in the formula. Moreover, SAT(ϕ)∈ [0, 1] is the maximum fraction of clauses that can be
satisfied in ϕ. With this notation, the Dinur’s PCP Theorem reads as follows:
Theorem 1 (Dinur’s PCP Theorem (Dinur, 2007)). Given any 3SAT instance ϕ of size n, and a constant ρ ∈ (0, 18 ),
we can produce in polynomial time a 3SAT instance ϕ′ such that:
1. the size of ϕ′ is n polylog(n);
2. each clause of ϕ′ contains exactly 3 variables, and every variable is contained in at most d = O(1) clauses;
3. if SAT(ϕ) = 1, then SAT(ϕ′) = 1;
4. if SAT(ϕ) < 1, then SAT(ϕ′) < 1− ρ.
A 3SAT formula can be seen as a bipartite graph in which the left vertices are the variables, the right vertices are the
clauses, and there is an edge between a variable and a clause whenever that variable appears in that clause. Then, a
such bipartite graph has constant degree since each vertex has constant degree. This holds because each clause has at
most 3 variables and each variable is contained in at most d clauses. A useful result on bipartite graphs is the following.
Lemma 1 (Lemma 1 of Deligkas et al. (2016)). Let (V,E) be a bipartite graph with |V | = n, and U and W be the
two disjoints and independent sets such that V = U ∪W , and where each vertex has degree at most d. Suppose that U
andW both have a constant fraction of the vertices, i.e., |U | = cn and |W | = (1− c)n for some c ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we
can efficiently find a partition {Si}
√
n
i=1 of U , and a partition {Ti}
√
n
i=1 of W , such that each set has size at most 2
√
n,
and for all i and j we have |(Si × Tj) ∩ E| ≤ 2d2.
Lemma 1 can be used to build the following free game.
Definition 1 (Definition 2 of Deligkas et al. (2016)). Given a 3SAT formula ϕ of size n, we define a free game Fϕ as
follows:
1. Arthur applies Theorem 1 to obtain formula ϕ′ of size n polylog(n);
2. let m =
√
n polylog(n). Arthur applies Lemma 1 to partition the variables of ϕ′ in sets {Si}mi=1, and the
clauses in sets {Ti}mi=1;
3. Arthur draws an index i uniformly at random from [m], and independently an index j uniformly at random
from [m]. Then, he sends Si to Merlin1 and Tj to Merlin2;
4. Merlin1 responds by choosing a truth assignment for each variable in Si, and Merlin2 responds by choosing
a truth assignment to every variable that is involved with a clause in Tj;
5. Arthur awards the Merlins payoff 1 if and only if the following conditions are both satisfied:
• Merlin2’s assignment satisfies all clauses in Tj;
• the two Merlins’ assignments are compatible, i.e., for each variable v appearing in Si and each clause
in Tj that contains v, Merlin1’s assignment to v agrees with Merlin2’s assignment to v;
Arthur awards payoff 0 otherwise.
When computing Merlins’ awards, the second condition is always satisfied when Si and Tj share no variables. More-
over, when Merlin1’s and Merlin2’s assignments are not compatible, we say that they are in conflict.
The following lemma shows that, if ϕ is unsatisfiable, then the value of Fϕ is bounded away from 1.
Lemma 2 (Lemma 2 by Deligkas et al. (2016)). Given a 3SAT formula ϕ, the following holds:
6
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• if ϕ is satisfiable then ω(Fϕ) = 1;
• if ϕ is unsatisfiable then ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1− ρ/2d.
We prove the following original result, which follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. Given a 3SAT formula ϕ, if ϕ is unsatisfiable, then for each (possibly randomized) Merlin2’s strategy η2
there exists a set Si such that each Merlin1’s assignment to variables in Si is in conflict with Merlin2’s assignment
with probability at least ρ/2d.
Proof. Let ω(Fϕ, η2|Si) be the probability with which Arthur accepts Merlin’s answers when Merlin1 receives Si,
and Merlin2 follows strategy η2. Formally:
ω(Fϕ, η2|Si) := max
η1
ETi [V(Si, Ti, η1, η2)].
By definition of the value of a free game, we have:
ω(Fϕ) = 1
m
max
η2
∑
Si
ω(Fϕ, η2|Si) ≥ max
η2
min
Si
ω(Fϕ, η2|Si).
Then, by Lemma 2, this results in:
max
η2
min
Si
ω(Fϕ, η2|Si) ≤ 1− ρ
2d
,
which proves our statement.
We define FREEGAMEδ as a particular problem within the class of promise problems (see, e.g., Even et al. (1984);
Goldreich (2006)).
Definition 2 (FREEGAMEδ).
• INPUT: a free game Fϕ and a constant δ > 0.
• OUTPUT: YES-instances: ω(Fϕ) = 1; NO-instances: ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1− δ.
Finally, the following lower bound will be exploited in the remainder of the paper. We will need to assume the
Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH), which conjectures that any deterministic algorithm solving 3SAT requires 2Ω(n)
time.
Theorem 2. (Theorem 2 by Deligkas et al. (2016)) Assuming ETH, there exists a constant δ = ρ/2d such that
FREEGAMEδ requires time n
Ω˜(logn).2
3.2 Error-Correcting Codes
A message of length k ∈ N+ is encoded as a block of length n ∈ N+, with n ≥ k. A code is a mapping e : {0, 1}k →
{0, 1}n. Moreover, let dist(e(x), e(y)) be the relative Hamming distance between e(x) and e(y), which is defined as
the Hamming distance weighted by 1/n. The rate of a code is defined as R = kn . Finally, the relative distance dist(e)
of a code e is the maximum value d such that dist(e(x), e(y)) ≥ d for each x, y ∈ {0, 1}k.
In the following, we will need an infinite sequence of codes E := {ek : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n}k∈N+ containing one code
ek for each possible message length k. The following result, due to Gilbert (1952), can be used to construct an infinite
sequence of codes with constant rate and distance.
Theorem 3 (Gilbert-Varshamov Bound). For every k ∈ N+, 0 ≤ d < 12 and n ≥ k1−H2(d) , there exists a code
e : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}n with dist(e) = d, where
H2(d) := d log2
(
1
d
)
+ (1 − d) log2
(
1
1− d
)
.
Moreover, it can be computed in time 2O(n).
2Ω˜ hides polylogarithmic factors.
7
ARXIV PREPRINT - APRIL 1, 2020
4 Maximum ǫ-Feasible Subsystem of linear inequalities
Given a system of linear inequalitiesAx ≥ 0withA ∈ [−1, 1]nrow×ncol and x ∈ ∆ncol , we study the problem of finding
the largest subsystem of linear inequalities that violates the constraints of at most ǫ. As we will show in Section 5, this
problem presents some deep connections with the problem of determining good posteriors in signaling problems.
Definition 3 (ǫ-MFS). Given a matrix A ∈ [−1, 1]nrow×ncol , let x∗ ∈ ∆ncol be the probability vector maximizing
k∗ :=
∑
i∈[nrow] I[w
∗
i ≥ 0], where w∗ := Ax∗. The problem of finding the maximum ǫ-feasible subsystem of linear
inequalities (ǫ-MFS) amounts to finding a probability vector x ∈ ∆ncol such that, by letting w = Ax, it holds:∑
i∈[nrow] I[wi ≥ −ǫ] ≥ k∗.
This problem is previously studied by Cheng et al. (2015). They design a bi-criteria PTAS for the ǫ-MFS problem
guaranteeing the satisfaction of at least k∗ − ǫ nrow inequalities. Initially, we show that ǫ-MFS can be solved in
nO(logn) steps. We introduce the following auxiliary definition.
Definition 4 (k-uniform distribution). A probability distribution x ∈ ∆X is k-uniform if and only if it is the average
of a multiset of k basis vectors in |X |-dimensional space.
Equivalently, each entry xi of a k-uniform distribution has to be a multiple of 1/k. Then, the following result holds.
Theorem 4. ǫ-MFS can be solved in nO(logn) steps.
Proof. Denote by x∗ the optimal solution of ǫ-MFS. Let x˜ ∈ ∆ncol be the empirical distribution of k i.i.d. samples
drawn from probability distribution x∗. Moreover, let w∗ := Ax∗ and w˜ := A x˜. By Hoeffding’s inequality we have
Pr(w∗i −w˜i ≥ ǫ) ≤ e−2kǫ
2
for each i ∈ [nrow]. Then, by the union bound, we get Pr(∃i s.t. w∗i −w˜i ≥ ǫ) ≤ nrowe−2kǫ
2
.
Finally, we can write Pr(w∗i − w˜i ≤ ǫ ∀i ∈ [nrow]) ≥ 1 − nrowe−2kǫ
2
. Thus, setting k = log nrow/ǫ
2 ensures the
existence of a vector x˜ guaranteeing that, if w∗i ≥ 0, then w˜i ≥ −ǫ. Since x˜ is k-uniform by construction, we can find
it by enumerating over all theO((ncol)
k) k-uniform probability vectors where k = lognrow/ǫ
2. Trivially, this task can
be performed in nlognrow/ǫ
2
steps and, therefore, in nO(log n) steps.
We show that ǫ-MFS requires at least nΩ˜(logn) steps, thus closing the gap with the upper bound stated by Theorem 4
except for polylogarithmic factors of logn in the denominator of the exponent.
Theorem 5. Assuming ETH, there exists a constant ǫ > 0 such that solving ǫ-MFS requires time nΩ˜(logn).
Proof. OVERVIEW. We provide a polynomial-time reduction from FREEGAMEδ (Def. 1) to ǫ-MFS, where ǫ =
δ
26 =ρ
52d (see Section 3.1 for the definition of parameters δ, ρ, d). We show that, given a free gameFϕ instance, it is possible
to build a matrix A s.t., for a certain value k∗, the following holds: (i) if ω(Fϕ) = 1, then there exists a vector x s.t.∑
i∈[nrow]
I[wi ≥ 0] = k∗, (4)
wherew = Ax; (ii) if ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1− δ, then all vectors x are s.t.∑
i∈[nrow]
I[wi ≥ −ǫ] < k∗. (5)
CONSTRUCTION. In the free game Fϕ, Arthur sends a set of variables Si to Merlin1 and a set of clauses Tj to
Merlin2, where i, j ∈ [m], m =
√
n polylog(n). Then, Merlin1’s (resp., Merlin2’s) answer is denoted by ξ1 ∈ Ξ1
(resp., ξ2 ∈ Ξ2). The system of linear inequalities used in the reduction has a vector of variables x structured as
follows.
1. Variables corresponding to Merlin2’s answers. There is a variable xTj ,ξ2 for each j ∈ [m] and, due to
Lemma 1 and the assumption |Tj | = 2m, it holds ξ2 ∈ Ξ2 = {0, 1}6m (if |Tj | < 2m, we extend ξ2 with
extra bits).
2. Variables corresponding to Merlin1’s answers. We need to introduce some further machinery to augment the
dimensionality ofΞ1 via a viable mapping. Let e : {0, 1}2m → {0, 1}8m be the code stated in Theorem 3with
rate 1/4 and relative distance dist(e) ≥ 1/5. We can safely assume that ξ1 ∈ Ξ1 = {0, 1}2m (if |Si| < 2m,
we extend ξ1 with extra bits). Then, e(ξ1) is the 8m-dimensional encoding of answer ξ1 via code e. Let e(ξ1)j
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be the j-th bit of vector e(ξ1). We have a variable xi,ℓ for each index i ∈ [8m] and ℓ := {ℓj}j∈[m] ∈ {0, 1}m.
These variables can be interpreted as follows. Suppose to have an answer encoding for each of the possible
set Sj . There are m such encodings, each of them having 8m bits. Then, it holds xi,ℓ > 0 if the i-th bit of
the encoding corresponding to Sj is ℓj .
There is a total of m 2m (25m + 8) variables. Matrix A has a number of columns equal to the number of variables.
We denote with A·,(Tj,ξ2) the column with the same index of variable xTj ,ξ2 . Analogously, A·,(i,ℓ) is the column
corresponding to variable xi,ℓ. Rows are grouped in four types, denoted by {ti}4i=1. We write Ati,· when referring to
an entry of any row of type ti. Further arguments may be added as a subscript to identify specific entries of A. Rows
are structured as follows.
1. Rows of type t1: there are q (the value of q is specified later in the proof) rows of type t1 s.t. At1,(Tj ,ξ2) = 1
for each j ∈ [m], ξ2 ∈ Ξ2, and At1,· = −1 otherwise.
2. Rows of type t2: there are q rows for each subset T ⊆ {Tj}j∈[m] with cardinalitym/2 (i.e., there is a total
of q
(
m
m/2
)
rows of type t2). Then, the following holds for each T :
A(t2,T ),(Tj ,ξ2) =
{ −1 if Tj ∈ T , ξ2 ∈ Ξ2
1 if Tj /∈ T , ξ2 ∈ Ξ2 and A(t2,T ),(i,ℓ) = 0 for each i ∈ [8m], ℓ ∈ {0, 1}
m.
3. Rows of type t3: there are q rows of type t3 for each subset of 4m indices I drawn from [8m], for a total of
q
(
8m
4m
)
t3 rows. For each subset of indices I we have:
A(t3,I),(Tj,ξ2) = 0 for each Tj , ξ2 and A(t3,I),(i,ℓ) =
{ −1 if i ∈ I, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}m
1 if i /∈ I, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}m .
4. Rows of type t4: there is a row of type t4 for each Si and ξ1. Each of these rows is s.t.:
A(t4,Si,ξ1),(Tj ,ξ2) =
{ −1/2 if V(Si, Tj, ξ1, ξ2) = 1
−1 otherwise and A(t4,Si,ξ1),(j,ℓ) =
{
1/2 if e(ξ1)j = ℓi
−1 otherwise .
Finally, we set k∗ =
(
1 +
(
m
m/2
)
+
(
8m
4m
))
q + m and q ≫ m (e.g., q = 210m). We say that row i satisfies ǫ-
MFS condition for a certain x if wi ≥ −ǫ, where w = Ax (in the following, we will also consider wi ≥ 0 as an
alternative condition). We require at least k∗ rows to satisfy the ǫ-MFS condition. Then, all rows of types t1, t2, t3
and at leastm rows of type t4 must be s.t. wi satisfies the condition.
COMPLETENESS. Given a satisfiable assignment of variables ζ to ϕ, we build vectorx as follows. Let ζTj be the partial
assignment obtained by restricting ζ to the variables in the clauses of Tj (if |Tj| < 2m we pad ζTj with bits 0 until ζTj
has length 6m). Then, we set xTj ,ζTj = 1/2m. Moreover, for each i ∈ [8m] and ℓi = (e(ζS1)i, . . . , e(ζSm)i), we set
xi,ℓi = 1/16m. We show that x is s.t. there are at least k
∗ rows i with wi ≥ 0 (Condition (4)). First, each row i of type
t1 is s.t. wi = 0 since
∑
Tj ,ξ2
xTj ,ξ2 =
∑
i,ℓ xi,ℓ = 1/2. For each Tj ,
∑
ξ2
xTj ,ξ2 = 1/2m. Then, for each subset
T of {Tj}j∈[m], we have
∑
ξ2,Tj∈T xTj ,ξ2 = 1/4. This implies that each row i of type t2 is s.t. wi = 0. A similar
argument holds for rows of type t3. Finally, we show that for each Si there is at least a row i of type t4 s.t. wi ≥ 0.
Take the row corresponding to (Si, ζSi). For each xb,ℓ > 0 where b ∈ [8m] and ℓ ∈ {0, 1}m, it holds e(ζSi)b = ℓi.
Then, there are 8m columns played with probability 1/16m with value 1/2, i.e.,
∑
b,ℓA(t4,Si,ζSi ),(b,ℓ)xb,ℓ = 1/4.
Moreover, for each (Tj , ζTj ), it holds V(Si, Tj, ζSi , ζTj ) = 1. Then,
∑
Tj ,ξ2
A(t4,Si,ζSi ),(Tj ,ζTj )xTj ,ξ2 = −1/4. This
concludes the completeness section.
SOUNDNESS. We show that, if ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1− δ, there is not any probability distribution x s.t.∑
i∈nrow
I[wi ≥ −ǫ] ≥ k∗, (6)
with w = Ax. Assume, by contradiction, that one such vector x exists. For the sake of clarity, we summarize the
structure of the proof. (i) We show that the probability assigned by x to columns of type (Tj , ξ2) has to be close
to 1/2, and the same has to hold for columns of type (i, ℓ). (ii) We show that x has to distribute probability almost
uniformly among Tjs and indices i (resp., Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 below). Intuitively, this resembles the fact that, in
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Fϕ, Arthur draws questions Tj according to a uniform probability distribution. (iii) For each Si, there is at most one
row (t4, Si, ξ1) s.t. w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ (Lemma 7). This implies, together with the hypothesis, that there exists exactly
one such row for each Si. (iv) Finally, we show that the above construction leads to a contradiction with Lemma 3 for
a suitable free game.
Before providing the details of the four above steps, we introduce the following result, due to Babichenko et al. (2015).
Lemma 4 (Essentially Lemma 2 of Babichenko et al. (2015)). Let v ∈ ∆n be a probability vector, and u be the
n-dimensional uniform probability vector. If ||v − u|| > c, then there exists a subset of indices I ⊆ [n] such that
|I| = n/2 and∑i∈I vi > 12 + c4 .
Then,
(i) Equation 6 requires all rows i of type t1, t2, t3 to be s.t. wi ≥ −ǫ. This implies that, for rows of type t1, it holds∑
Tj ,ξ2
xTj ,ξ2 ≥ 1/2(1 − ǫ). Indeed, if, by contradiction, this inequality does not hold, each row i of type t1
would be s.t.wi < 1/2−ǫ/2−(1/2+ǫ/2) = −ǫ, thus violating Equation 6. Moreover, Equation 6 implies that at
least a row (t4, Si, ξ1) has w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ. Therefore, it holds
∑
i,ℓ xi,ℓ ≥ 1/2− ǫ. Indeed, if, by contradiction,
this condition did not hold, all rows of type t4 would have wi < 1/2(1/2− ǫ)− 1/2(1/2+ ǫ) = −ǫ.
(ii) Let v1 ∈ ∆m be the probability vector defined as v1,j :=
∑
ξ2
xTj,ξ2∑
j,ξ2
xTj,ξ2
, and v˜ be a generic uniform probability
vector of suitable dimension. The following result shows that the element-wise difference between v1 and v˜ has
to be bounded if Equation 6 has to be satisfied.
Lemma 5. If ||v1 − v˜||1 > 16ǫ, there exists a row i of type t2 such that wi < −ǫ.
Proof. Lemma 4 implies that, if ||v1 − v˜||1 > 16ǫ, there exists a subset T ⊆ {Tj}j∈[m] such that∑
Tj∈T
∑
ξ2
xTj ,ξ2 > (1/2+4ǫ)
∑
j,ξ2
xTj ,ξ2 > 1/4+ǫ. It follows that
∑
Tj /∈T
∑
ξ2
xTj ,ξ2 < 1/2+ǫ−1/4−ǫ =
1/4, which implies that row (t2, T ) is s.t. wt2,T < −1/4− ǫ+ 1/4 < −ǫ.
Let v2 ∈ ∆[8m] be the probability vector defined as v2,i :=
∑
ℓ xi,ℓ∑
i,ℓ xi,ℓ
, and v˜ be a suitable uniform probability
vector. The following holds.
Lemma 6. If ||v2 − v˜||1 > 16ǫ, there exists a row i of type t3 such that wi < −ǫ.
Proof. Lemma 4 implies that, if ||v2 − v˜||1 > 16ǫ, there exists a set I ⊆ [8m] such that
∑
i∈I
∑
ℓ xi,ℓ >
(1/2 + 4ǫ)
∑
i,ℓ xi,ℓ > 1/4 + ǫ. Then,
∑
i/∈I
∑
ℓ xi,ℓ < 1/2 + ǫ/2− 1/4− ǫ = 1/4− ǫ/2. It follows that there
exists a row (t3, I) such that wt3,I < −1/4− ǫ+ 1/4− ǫ/2 < −ǫ.
In order to satisfy Equation 6, all rows i of type t2 and t3 have to be s.t. wi ≥ −ǫ. Then, by Lemmas 5 and 6, it
has to hold that ||v1 − v˜||1 ≤ 16ǫ and ||v2 − v˜||1 ≤ 16ǫ.
(iii) We show that, for each Si, there exists at most one row (t4, Si, ξ1) for which w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ.
Lemma 7. For each Si, i ∈ [m], there exists at most one row (t4, Si, ξ1) s.t. w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ.
Proof. Let f(x, ξ1) :=
∑
j:ℓi=e(ξ1)j
xj,ℓ. Assume, by contradiction, that for a given Si there exist two assign-
ments ξ′1 and ξ
′′
1 such that w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ for each ξ1 ∈ {ξ′1, ξ′′1 }. Then, f(x, ξ1) ≥ 1/2 − ǫ, for each
ξ1 ∈ {ξ′1, ξ′′1 }. Otherwise we would get w(t4,Si,ξ1) < 1/2(1/2 − ǫ) − 1/2(1/2 + ǫ) = −ǫ for at least one
ξ1 ∈ {ξ′1, ξ′′1 }. Let x′ be the vector such that x′i,ℓ := xi,ℓ∑
i,ℓ xi,ℓ
. Then, f(x′, ξ1) ≥ 1/2−ǫ1/2+ǫ ≥ 1−4ǫ, for ξ1 ∈ {ξ′1, ξ′′1 }.
By Lemma 4 and 6, we have that ||v2 − v˜||1 ≤ 16ǫ. Therefore, we can obtain a uniform vector x˜ by moving at
most 16ǫ probability from x′. This results in a decrease of f of at most 16ǫ, that is f(x˜, ξ1) ≥ 1 − 20ǫ for each
ξ1 ∈ {ξ′1, ξ′′1 }.
By construction dist(e) = 1/5, which implies dist(e(ξ′1), e(ξ
′′
1 )) ≥ 1/5. Then, there exists a set of indices I,
with |I| ≥ 8m/5, such that e(ξ′1)j 6= e(ξ′′1 )j for each j ∈ I. Therefore, f(x˜, ξ′1) + f(x˜, ξ′′1 ) ≤
∑
j∈I 1/8m +∑
j /∈I 2/8m ≤ 2− 1/5. This leads to a contradiction with f(x˜, ξ′1) + f(x˜, ξ′′1 ) ≥ 2− 40ǫ.
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Then, there are at least m rows (t4, Si, ξ1) s.t. w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ and, by Lemma 7, we get that there
exists exactly one such row for each Si, i ∈ [m]. Therefore, for each Si, there exists ξi1 ∈ Ξ1
s.t.
∑
(Tj ,ξ2):V(Si,Tj ,ξi1,ξ2)=1 x(Tj ,ξ2) ≥ 1/2 − 4ǫ. If this condition did not hold, by Step (i), we would obtain
w
t4,Si,ξi1
< −1/2(1/2− 4ǫ)− 7/2ǫ+ 1/2(1/2 + ǫ/2) = −ǫ.
(iv) Finally, let F∗ϕ be a free game in which Arthur (i.e., the verifier) chooses question Tj with probability v1,j as
defined in Step (ii), and Merlin2 (i.e., the second prover) answers ξ2 with probability xTj ,ξ2/v1,j . In this set-
ting (i.e., F∗ϕ), given question Si to Merlin1, the two provers will provide compatible answers with probability
P(V∗(Si, Tj, ξi1, ξ2) = 1 | Si) = 1/2−4ǫ∑
j,ξ2
xTj,ξ2
≥ 1/2−4ǫ1/2+ǫ ≥ 1 − 10ǫ, where the first inequality holds for the
condition at Step (i). In a canonical (i.e., as in Definition 1) free game Fϕ, Arthur picks questions according to
a uniform probability distribution. The main difference between Fϕ and F∗ϕ is that, in the latter, Arthur draws
questions for Merlin2 from v1. However, we know that differences between v1 and a uniform probability vector
must be limited. Specifically, by Lemma 5, we have ||v1 − v˜||1 ≤ 16ǫ. Then, if Merlin1 and Merlin2 ap-
plied in Fϕ the strategies we described for F∗ϕ, their answers would be compatible with probability at least
P(V(Si, Tj, ξi1, ξ2) = 1 | Si) ≥ 1 − 26ǫ, for each Si. Finally, by picking ǫ = ρ/52d, we reach a contradiction
with Lemma 3. This concludes the proof.
5 The Hardness of (α, ǫ)-persuasion
We show that a public signaling scheme approximating the value of the optimal one cannot be computed in polynomial
time even if we allow it to be ǫ-persuasive (see Equation 2). Specifically, computing an (α, ǫ)-persuasive signaling
scheme requires at least nΩ˜(logn), where the dimension of the instance is n = O(n¯ d). We prove this result for the
specific case of the k-voting problem, as introduced in Section 2.4. Besides its practical applicability, this problem is
particularly instructive in highlighting the strong connection between the problem of finding suitable posteriors and
the ǫ-MFS problem, as discussed in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Given a k-voting instance, the problem of finding a posterior p ∈ ∆Θ such thatWǫ(p) ≥ 0 is equivalent
to finding an ǫ-feasible subsystem of k linear inequalities over the simplex when A ∈ [−1, 1]n¯×d is such that:
Ar,θ = u
r
θ(a0)− urθ(a1) for each r ∈ R, θ ∈ Θ. (7)
Proof. By setting x = p, it directly follows that
∑
i∈[n¯] I[Aix ≥ −ǫ] ≥ k iffWǫ(p) ≥ k.
The above lemma shows that deciding if there exists a posterior p such that W (p) ≥ k or if all the posteriors
have Wǫ(p) < k (i.e., deciding if the utility of the sender can be greater than zero) is as hard as solving ǫ-MFS.
More precisely, if the ǫ-MFS instance does not admit any solution, then there does not exist a posterior guaranteeing
the sender strictly positive winning probability. On the other hand, if the ǫ-MFS instance admits a solution, there
exists a signaling scheme where at least one of the induced posteriors guarantees the sender wining probability > 0.
However, the above connection between the ǫ-MFS problem and the k-voting problem is not sufficient to prove the
inapproximability of the k-voting problem, as the probability whereby this posterior is reached may be arbitrarily
small.
Luckily enough, the next theorem shows that it is possible to strengthen the inapproximability result by constructing
an instance in which, when 3SAT is satisfiable, there is a signaling scheme such that all the induced posteriors satisfy
W (p) ≥ k (i.e., the sender wins with probability 1).
Theorem 6. Given a k-voting instance and assuming ETH, there exists a constant ǫ∗ such that, for any ǫ ≤ ǫ∗, finding
an (α, ǫ)-persuasive signaling scheme requires nΩ˜(logn) steps for any multiplicative or additive factor α.
Proof. OVERVIEW. By following the proof of Theorem 4, we provide a polynomial-time reduction from
FREEGAMEδ to the problem of finding an ǫ-persuasive signaling scheme in k-voting, with ǫ = δ/780 = ρ/1560d.
Specifically, if ω(Fϕ) = 1, there exists a signaling scheme guaranteeing the sender an expected value of 1. Otherwise,
if ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1− δ, then all posteriors are such thatWǫ(p) < k (i.e., the sender cannot obtain more than 0).
CONSTRUCTION. The k-voting instance has the following possible states of nature.
11
ARXIV PREPRINT - APRIL 1, 2020
1. θ(Tj ,ξ2) for each set of clauses Tj , j ∈ [m], and answer ξ2 ∈ Ξ2 = {0, 1}6m. Let e : {0, 1}2m → {0, 1}8m
be an encoding function with R = 1/4 and dist(e) ≥ 1/5 (as in the proof of Theorem 4). We have a state
θ(i,ℓ) for each i ∈ [8m], and ℓ = (ℓ1, . . . , ℓm) ∈ {0, 1}m.
2. There is a state θd for each d ∈ {0, 1}7m. It is useful to see vector d as the union of the subvector dS ∈
{0, 1}m and the subvector dT ∈ {0, 1}6m.
The shared priorµ is such that: µθ(Tj,ξ2) =
1
m22+6m for each θ(Tj ,ξ2), µθ(i,ℓ) =
1
m25+m for each θ(i,ℓ), and µθd =
1
21+7m
for each θd. To simplify the notation, in the remaining of the proof let u
r
θ := u
r
θ(a0)− urθ(a1). The k-voting instance
comprises the following receivers.
1. Receivers of type t1: there are q (the value of q is specified later in the proof) receivers of type t1, which are
such that ut1θ(Tj,ξ2)
= 1 for each (Tj, ξ2), and −1/3 otherwise.
2. Receivers of type t2: there are q receivers of type t2 such that u
t2
θ(i,ℓ)
= 1 for each (i, ℓ), and−1/3 otherwise.
3. Receivers of type t3: there are q receivers of type t3 for each subset T ⊆ {Tj}j∈[m] of cardinality m/2.
Each receiver corresponding to the subset T is such that:
u
(t3,T )
θ(Tj,ξ2)
=
{ −1 if Tj ∈ T , ξ2 ∈ Ξ2
1 if Tj /∈ T , ξ2 ∈ Ξ2 and u
(t3,T )· = 0 otherwise.
4. Receivers of type t4: we have q receivers ot type t4 for each subset I of 4m indices selected from [8m]. Each
receiver corresponding to subset I is such that:
u
(t4,I)
θ(i,ℓ)
=
{ −1 if i ∈ I, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}m
1 if i /∈ I, ℓ ∈ {0, 1}m and u
(t4,I)· = 0 otherwise.
5. Receivers of type t5: there is a receiver of type t5 for each Si, ξ1 ∈ Ξ1 and d ∈ {0, 1}7m. Let⊕ be the XOR
operator. Then, for each receiver of type t5 the following holds:
u
(t5,Si,ξ1,d)
θ =


−1/2 if θ = θ(Tj ,ξ2) and V(Si, Tj, ξ1, ξ2 ⊕ dT ) = 1
−1/2 if θ = θ(i′,ℓ) and e(ξ1)i′ = [ℓ⊕ dS ]i
1/2 if θ = θd
−1 otherwise
.
Finally, we set k =
(
2 +
(
m
m/2
)
+
(
8m
4m
))
q +m. By setting q ≫ m (e.g., q = 210m), candidate a0 can get at least k
votes only if all receivers of type t1, t2, t3, t4 vote for her.
COMPLETENESS. Given a satisfiable assignment ζ to the variables in ϕ, let [ζ]Tj ∈ {0, 1}6m be the vector specifying
the variables assignment of each clause in Tj , and [ζ]Si ∈ {0, 1}2m be the vector specifying the assignment of each
variable belonging to Si. The sender has a signal for each d ∈ {0, 1}7m. The set of signals is denoted by S, where
|S| = 27m, and a signal is denoted by sd ∈ S. We define a signaling scheme φ as follows. First, we set φθd(sd) = 1
for each θd. If |Tj | < 2m for some j ∈ [m], we pad [ζ]Tj with bits 0 util |[ζ]Tj | = 6m. Then, for each Tj ,
φθ(Tj,[ζ]Tj⊕dT )
(sd) = 1/2
m. For each i ∈ [8m], set φθ(i,ℓ⊕dS) = 1/26m, where ℓ = (e([ζ]S1 )i, . . . , e([ζ]Sm)i). First,
we prove that the signaling scheme is consistent. For each state θ(Tj ,ξ2), it holds that∑
sd∈S
φθ(Tj,ξ2)(sd) =
1
2m
|{d : [ζ]Tj ⊕ dT = ξ2}| = 1,
and, for each θ(i,ℓ), the following holds:∑
sd∈S
φθ(i,ℓ)(sd) =
1
26m
|{d : (e([ζ]S1)i, . . . , e([ζ]Sm)i ⊕ dS = ℓ}| = 1.
Now, we show that there exist at least k voters that will choose a0. Let p ∈ ∆Θ be the posterior induced by a signal
sd. All receivers of type t1 choose a0 since it holds:∑
(Tj ,ξ2)
pθ(Tj,ξ2) =
∑
(Tj ,ξ2)
µθ(Tj,ξ2)φθ(Tj ,ξ2)(sd)∑
θ∈Θ µθφθ(sd)
=
1
22+7m
(
1
21+7m
+
1
22+7m
+
1
22+7m
)−1
=
1
4
.
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Analogously, all receivers of type t2 select a0. For each Tj , it holds
∑
ξ2
pθ(Tj,ξ2) = 1/4m. Then, for each subset
T ⊆ {Tj}j∈[m] of cardinality m/2,
∑
Tj∈T ,ξ2 pθ(Tj,ξ2) = m/2 · 1/4m = 1/8. Therefore, each receiver of type t3
chooses a0. An analogous argument holds for receivers of type t4.
Finally, we show that, for each Si, the receiver (t5, Si, [ζ]Si ,d) chooses a0. Receiver (t5, Si, [ζ]Si ,d) has the follow-
ing expected utility:
1
2
pθd −
1
2
∑
(Tj ,ξ2)
pθ(Tj,ξ2) −
1
2
∑
(i′,ℓ)
pθ(i′,ℓ) = 0
since, for each p(Tj ,ξ2) > 0, ξ2 ⊕ dT = [ζ]Tj ⊕ dT ⊕ dT = [ζ]Tj and V(Si, Tj , [ζ]Si , ξ2 ⊕ dT ) =
V(Si, Tj, [ζ]Si , [ζ]Tj ) = 1 for each Tj . Moreover, for each p(θi′,l) > 0, [l⊕dS ]i = e([ζ]Si)i′⊕dS,i⊕dS,i = e([ζ]Si)i′ .
This concludes the completeness section. 3
SOUNDNESS. We prove that, if ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1 − δ, there does not exists a posterior in which a0 is chosen by at least k
receivers, thus implying that the sender’s utility is equal to 0. Now, suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists
a posterior p such that at least k receivers select a0. Let γ :=
∑
(Tj ,ξ2)
pθ(Tj,ξ2) +
∑
(i,ℓ) pθ(i,ℓ) . Since all voters of
types t1 and t2 vote for a0, it holds that
∑
(Tj ,ξ2)
pθ(Tj,ξ2) ≥ 14 − ǫ and
∑
(i,ℓ) pθ(i,ℓ) ≥ 14 − ǫ. Moreover, since at least
a receiver (t5, Si, ξ1,d) must play a0, there exists a d ∈ {0, 1}7m and a state θd with pθd ≥ 12 − ǫ. This implies that
1
2 − 2ǫ ≤ γ ≤ 12 + ǫ.
Consider the reduction to ǫ′-MFS, with ǫ′ = ρ/52d (Theorem 5). Let x(Tj ,ξ2) = pθ(Tj,ξ2⊕dT )/γ, x(i,ℓ) = pθ(i,ℓ⊕dS)/γ,
and ǫ = ǫ′/30. All rows of type t1 of ǫ′-MFS are such that
wt1 =
1
γ

 ∑
(Tj ,ξ2)
pθ(Tj,ξ2) −
∑
(i,l)
pθ(i,l)

 ≥ −3ǫ
γ
≥ −9ǫ ≥ −ǫ′.
All voters of type t3 choose a0. Then, for all T ⊆ {Tj}j∈[m] of cardinalitym/2, it holds:∑
(Tj ,ξ2):Tj∈T
pθ(Tj,ξ2) −
∑
(Tj ,ξ2):Tj /∈T
pθ(Tj,ξ2) ≥ −ǫ.
Then, all rows of type t2 of ǫ
′-MFS are such that:
w(t2,T ) =
1
γ

 ∑
(Tj ,ξ2):Tj∈T
pθ(Tj,ξ2) −
∑
(Tj ,ξ2):Tj /∈T
pθ(Tj,ξ2)

 ≥ − ǫ
γ
≥ −3ǫ ≥ −ǫ′.
A similar argument proves that all rows of type t3 of ǫ
′-MFS have w(t3,I) ≥ −ǫ′.
To conclude the proof, we prove that, for each voter (t5, Si, ξ1,d) that votes for a0, the corresponding row
(t4, Si, ξ1) of ǫ
′-MFS is such that w(t4,Si,ξ1) ≥ −ǫ′. Let γ′ :=
∑
(Tj ,ξ2):V(Si,Tj ,ξ1,ξ2)=1 x(Tj ,ξ2) and γ
′′ :=∑
(i′,ℓ):e(ξ1)i′=ℓi
x(i′,ℓ). First, we have that γ
′ ≥ 1/4− 7ǫ. If this did not hold, we would have∑
θ
pθu
(t5,Si,ξ1,d)
θ < −
1
2
(1/4− ǫ)− 1
2
(1/4− 7ǫ)− 6ǫ+ 1
2
(1/2 + 2ǫ) = ǫ.
Similarly, γ′′ ≥ 1/4− 7ǫ. Hence
w(t4,Si,ξ1) = −
1
2
γ′ +
1
2
γ′′ − (1− γ′ − γ′′) =
=
1
2γ

 ∑
(Tj ,ξ2):V(Si,Tj ,ξ1,ξ2)=1
pθ(Tj,ξ2⊕dT ) + 3
∑
(i′,ℓ):e(ξ1)i′=ℓi
pθ(i′,ℓ⊕dS)

− 1 ≥
≥ 2(1/4− 7ǫ)
1/2 + ǫ
− 1 ≥ −30ǫ = −ǫ′.
Thus, there exists a probability vector x for ǫ′-MFS in which at least k rows satisfy the ǫ′-MFS condition (Equation 5),
which is in contradiction with ω(Fϕ) ≤ 1− δ. This concludes the proof.
3 To simplify the presentation, we employed indirect signals of type sd. However, it is possible to construct an equivalent direct
signaling scheme. Let pd ∈ ∆Θ be the posterior induced by sd. Then, it is enough to substitute each sd with a direct signal
recommending a0 to all receivers such that
∑
θ
pdθu
r
θ ≥ 0, and a1 to all the others.
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6 A quasi-polynomial time algorithm for (α, ǫ)-persuasion
In this section, we prove that our hardness result (Theorem 6) is tight by devising a bi-criteria approximation algorithm.
Our result extends the results by Cheng et al. (2015) and Xu (2019) for signaling problems with binary action spaces.
Indeed, it encompasses scenarios with an arbitrary number of actions and state-dependent sender’s utility functions.
In order to prove our result, we need some further machinery. Let Zr := 2Ar be the power set of Ar. Then,
Z := ×r∈RZr is the set of tuples specifying a subset of Ar for each receiver r. For a given probability distribution
over the states of nature, we are interested in determining the set of best responses of each receiver r, i.e., the subset
of Ar maximizing her expected utility. Formally, we have the following.
Definition 5 (BR-set). Given p ∈ ∆Θ, the best-response set (BR-set)Mp := (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ Z is such that
Zr = argmax
a∈Ar
∑
θ∈Θ
pθu
r
θ(a) for each r ∈ R.
Similarly, we define a notion of ǫ-BR-set which comprises ǫ-approximate best responses to a given distribution over
the states of nature.
Definition 6 (ǫ-BR-set). Given p ∈ ∆Θ, the ǫ-best-response set (ǫ-BR-set)Mp,ǫ := (Z1, . . . , Zn) ∈ Z is such that,
for each r ∈ R, action a belongs to Zr if and only if∑
θ∈Θ
pθu
r
θ(a) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
pθu
r
θ(a
′)− ǫ for each a′ ∈ Ar.
We introduce a suitable notion of approximability of the sender’s objective function. Our notion of α-approximable
function is a generalization of Xu (2019, Definition 4.5) to the setting of arbitrary action spaces and state-dependent
sender’s utility functions.
Definition 7 (α-Approximability). Let f := {fθ}θ∈Θ be a set of functions fθ : A → [0, 1]. We say that f is α-
approximable if there exists a function g : ∆Θ × Z → A computable in polynomial time such that, for all p ∈ ∆Θ
and Z ∈ Z , it holds: a = g(p, Z), a ∈ Z and∑
θ∈Θ
pθfθ(a) ≥ αmax
a
∗∈Z
∑
θ∈Θ
pθfθ(a
∗).
The α-approximability assumption is natural since otherwise it would be intractable even to evaluate the sender’s
objective value. When f is α-approximable, it is possible to find an approximation of the optimal receivers’ tie
breaking when they are constrained to select actions profiles in Z .
We now provide an algorithm which computes in quasi-polynomial time, for any α-approximable f , a bi-criteria
approximation of the optimal solution with an approximation on the objective value arbitrarily close to α. When f is
1-approximate our result yields a bi-criteria QPTAS for the problem. The key idea is showing that an optimal signaling
scheme can be approximated by a convex combination of suitable k-uniform posteriors. Let ̺ := maxr∈R ̺r, n¯ :=
|R|, and d := |Θ|.
Theorem 7. Assume f is α-approximate, there exists a poly
(
n
log(n/δ)
ǫ2
)
algorithm that outputs an α(1 − δ)-
approximate ǫ-persuasive public signaling scheme.
Proof. We show that there exists a poly
(
d
log(n¯̺/δ)
ǫ2
)
algorithm that computes the given approximation. Let k =
32 log(4n¯̺/δ)
ǫ2 andK ⊂ ∆Θ be the set of k-uniform distributions overΘ (Def. 4). We prove that all posteriors p∗ ∈ ∆Θ
can be decomposed as a convex combination of k-uniform posteriors without lowering too much the sender’s expected
utility. Formally, each posterior p∗ ∈ ∆Θ can be written as p∗ =
∑
p∈K γpp, with γ ∈ ∆K such that∑
p∈K
γp
∑
θ∈Θ
pθfθ(g(p,Mǫ(p))) ≥ α(1− δ) max
a∗∈M(p∗)
∑
θ∈Θ
p∗θfθ(a
∗).
Let γ˜ ∈ K be the empirical distribution of k i.i.d. samples from p∗, where each θ has probability p∗θ of being sampled.
Therefore, the vector γ˜ is a random variable supported on k-uniform posteriors with expectation p∗. Moreover, let
γ ∈ ∆K be a probability distribution such as, for each p ∈ K, γp := Pr(γ˜ = p). For a each γ ∈ ∆K and p ∈ K,
we define by γ
(θ,i)
p the conditional probability of having observed posterior p, given that the posterior must assign
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probability i/k to state θ. Formally, for each p ∈ K, if pθ = i/k we have γ(θ,i)p = γp/
∑
p′:p′θ=i/k
γp′ , and γ
(θ,i)
p = 0
otherwise. The random variable γ˜(θ,i) ∈ K is such that, for each p ∈ K, Pr(γ˜(θ,i) = p) = γ(θ,i)p . Finally, let P ⊆ K
be the set of posteriors such that p ∈ P if and only if |∑θ pθurθ(a)−∑θ p∗θurθ(a)| ≤ ǫ2 for each r ∈ R and a ∈ Ar.
We prove the following intermediate result.
Lemma 9. Given p∗ ∈ ∆Θ, for each θ ∈ Θ and for each i ∈ [k] such that |i/k − p∗θ| ≤ ǫ/4, it holds:∑
p∈P:pθ=i/k
γp ≥
(
1− δ
2
) ∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
γp,
where γ is the distribution of k i.i.d samples from p∗.
Proof. Fix θ¯ ∈ Θ and i ∈ [k] with |i/k − p∗¯
θ
| ≤ ǫ/4. Then, for each r ∈ R and a ∈ Ar, let t˜ra :=
∑
θ γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ u
r
θ(a)
and tra :=
∑
θ p
∗
θu
r
θ(a). First, we show that |E[t˜ra] − tra| ≤ ǫ/4. Equivalently, |
∑
θ u
r
θ(a)
(
E[γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ ]− p∗θ
)
| ≤ ǫ/4.
Assume i/k ≥ p∗¯
θ
. Then,
∑
θ
|E[γ˜(θ¯,i)θ ]− p∗θ| =
i
k
− p∗¯θ +
∑
θ 6=θ¯
(
p∗θ −
p∗θ∑
θ′ 6=θ¯ p
∗
θ′
·
(
1− i
k
))
≤ (8a)
≤ ǫ
4
+ 1− p∗¯θ − 1 +
i
k
≤ ǫ
2
. (8b)
Analogously, if i/k ≤ p∗¯
θ
, we get that
∑
θ |E[γ˜(θ¯,i)θ ] − p∗θ| ≤ ǫ/2. Let M1 :=
{
θ ∈ Θ | E[γ˜(θ¯,i)θ ]− p∗θ ≥ 0
}
, and
M2 := Θ \M1. Then,∑
θ
urθ(a)
(
E[γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ ]− p∗θ
)
=
∑
θ∈M1
urθ(a)
(
E[γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ ]− p∗θ
)
+
∑
θ∈M2
urθ(a)
(
E[γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ ]− p∗θ
)
≤ ǫ
4
,
where we use
∑
θ∈M2 u
r
θ(a)
(
E[γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ ]− p∗θ
)
≤ 0 and∑θ∈M1 urθ(a)
(
E[γ˜(θ¯,i)]− p∗θ
)
≤ ǫ/4 (by Equation 8). Anal-
ogously, it is possible to show that
∑
θ u
r
θ(a)
(
E[γ˜
(θ¯,i)
θ ]− p∗θ
)
≥ −ǫ/4.
Then, Pr(|tra − t˜ra| ≥ ǫ/2) ≤ Pr(|t˜ra − E[t˜ra]| ≥ ǫ/4). Moreover, by the Hoeffding’s inequality we have that, for each
r ∈ R and a ∈ Ar,
Pr(|t˜ra − E[t˜ra]| ≥ ǫ/4) ≤ 2e−2k(
ǫ
4 )
2
= 2e
−4ǫ2 log(4n¯̺/δ)
ǫ2 = 2
(
δ
4n¯̺
)4
≤ δ
2n¯̺
.
The union bound yields the following:
Pr

 ⋂
r∈R,a∈Ar
|t˜ra − tra| ≤
ǫ
2

 ≥1−∑
r,a
Pr
(
|t˜ra − tra| ≥
ǫ
2
)
≥
≥1−
∑
r,a
Pr
(
|t˜ra − E[t˜ra]| ≥
ǫ
4
)
= 1− δ
2
.
By the definition of P , this implies that Pr(γ˜(θ¯,i) ∈ P) ≥ 1− δ/2. Finally,∑
p∈P:pθ¯=i/k
γp =Pr
(
γ˜θ¯ =
i
k
)
Pr
(
γ˜ ∈ P | γ˜θ¯ =
i
k
)
=
=Pr
(
γ˜θ¯ =
i
k
)
Pr
(
γ˜(θ¯,i) ∈ P
)
≥
≥
(
1− δ
2
)
Pr
(
γ˜θ¯ =
i
k
)
=
(
1− δ
2
) ∑
p∈K:pθ¯=i/k
γp.
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Then, we prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 10. Given p∗ ∈ ∆Θ, for each θ ∈ Θ, it holds:∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≥ǫ/4
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
γp ≤ δ
2
p∗θ,
where γ is the distribution of k i.i.d samples from p∗.
Proof. The random variable γ˜θ is drawn from a binomial distribution. Then, by Chernoff’s bound
Pr
(
|γ˜θ − p∗θ| ≥
ǫ
4
)
≤2e−
kǫ2
32p∗
θ = 2e
− 32 log(4n¯̺/δ)
32p∗
θ = 2
(
δ
4n¯̺
) 1
p∗
θ ≤ (9a)
≤2
(
δ
16
) 1
p∗
θ
= (9b)
=2e
log( δ16 )
1
p∗
θ = 2
(
e
1
p∗
θ
)log( δ16 )
≤ (9c)
≤2
(
1
p∗θ
e
)log( δ16 )
≤ (9d)
≤2
(
1
p∗θ
)−1
elog(
δ
16 ) ≤ (9e)
≤ δ
2
p∗θ. (9f)
We get from (9a) to (9b) via the natural assumption of having at least 2 actions for each receiver (i.e., δ ≥ 2), and of
having at least 2 receivers (i.e., n¯ ≥ 2). In (9d) we are using ex ≥ ex. Then,
∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≥ǫ/4
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
γp = Pr
(
|γ˜θ − p∗θ| ≥
ǫ
4
)
≤ δ
2
p∗θ,
which concludes the proof of the lemma.
Now we can prove that, given a p∗ ∈ ∆Θ and for each θ,
∑
p∈P γppθ ≥ (1 − δ)p∗θ .
Lemma 11. Given a p∗ ∈ ∆Θ, for each θ ∈ Θ, it holds:∑
p∈P
γppθ ≥ (1 − δ)p∗θ,
where γ is the distribution of k i.i.d samples from p∗.
Proof. First, by restricting the set of posteriors, we have:
∑
p∈P
γppθ ≥
∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≤ǫ/4
i
k
∑
p∈P:pθ=i/k
γp.
By Lemma 9, ∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≤ǫ/4
i
k
∑
p∈P:pθ=i/k
γp ≥
∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≤ǫ/4
i
k
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
(
1− δ
2
)
γp.
Finally,
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∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≤ǫ/4
i
k
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
(
1− δ
2
)
γp =
(
1− δ
2
) ∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≤ǫ/4
i
k
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
γp ≥
≥
(
1− δ
2
)p∗θ − ∑
i:|i/k−p∗θ |≥ǫ/4
i
k
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
γp

 ≥
≥
(
1− δ
2
)p∗θ − ∑
i:|i/k−p∗
θ
|≥ǫ/4
∑
p∈K:pθ=i/k
γp

 ≥ (i/k ≤ 1)
≥
(
1− δ
2
)2
p∗θ ≥ (by Lemma 10)
≥(1 − δ)p∗θ.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
We need to prove that all the posteriors in P guarantee to the sender at least the same expected utility of p∗. Formally,
we prove that the ǫ-BR-set of each p ∈ P contains the BR-set of p∗. This is shown via the following lemma.
Lemma 12. Given p∗ ∈ ∆Θ, for each p ∈ P , it holds:M(p∗) ⊆Mǫ(p).
Proof. Let Z1 =Mǫ(p) and Z2 =M(p∗). Suppose a ∈ Zr2 . Then, for all a′ ∈ Ar,∑
θ
pθu
r
θ(a) ≥
∑
θ
p∗θu
r
θ(a)−
ǫ
2
≥
∑
θ
p∗θu
r
θ(a
′)− ǫ
2
≥
∑
θ
pθu
r
θ(a
′)− ǫ.
Thus, a ∈ Zr1 , which proves the lemma.
Finally, we prove that we can represent each posterior p∗ as a convex combination of k-uniform posteriors with a
small loss in the sender’s expected utility. For p ∈ K and Z ∈ Z , let g∗ : ∆Θ × Z → [0, 1] be a function such
that g∗(p, Z) := maxa∈Z
∑
θ pθfθ(a). Given p
∗ ∈ ∆Θ, we are interested in bounding the difference in the sender’s
expected utility when p∗ is approximated as a convex combination γ of k-uniform posteriors, the sender exploits an
α-approximation of f , and she allows receivers for ǫ-persuasive best-responses. Formally,
Lemma 13. Given a p∗ ∈ ∆Θ, it holds:∑
p∈K
γp
∑
θ
pθfθ(g(p,Mǫ(p))) ≥ fθ(g∗(p∗,M(p∗))),
where γ is the distribution of k i.i.d samples from p∗.
Proof. We prove the following:∑
p∈K
γp
∑
θ
pθfθ(g(p,Mǫ(p))) ≥ (Relaxed sender’s expected util.)
≥α
∑
p∈K
γp
∑
θ
pθfθ(g
∗(p,Mǫ(p))) ≥ (by Def. 7)
≥α
∑
p∈P
γp
∑
θ
pθfθ(g
∗(p,Mǫ(p))) ≥ (By restricting the set of posteriors)
≥α
∑
p∈P
γp
∑
θ
pθfθ(g
∗(p∗,Mǫ(p))) ≥ (Optimality of g∗)
≥α
∑
p∈P
γp
∑
θ
pθfθ(g
∗(p∗,M(p∗))) ≥ (By Lemma 12)
≥α(1 − δ)
∑
θ
p∗θfθ(g
∗(p∗,M(p∗))) (By Lemma 11)
This concludes the proof.
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Thus, we can restrict to posteriors in K. Since there are |K| = poly
(
d
log(n¯̺/ǫ)
ǫ2
)
posteriors, the following linear
program (LP 12) has O(|K|) variables and constraints and finds a α(1 − δ)-approximation of the optimal signaling
scheme:
max
γ∈∆K
∑
p∈K
γp
∑
θ∈Θ
pθfθ(g(p,Mǫ(p))) (12a)
s.t.
∑
p∈K
γppθ = µθ ∀θ ∈ Θ (12b)
Given the distribution on the k-uniform posteriors γ, we can construct a direct signaling scheme φ by setting, for each
θ ∈ Θ and a ∈ A,
φθ(a) =
∑
p∈K:a=g(p,Mǫ(p))
γppθ.
We showed that such a φ is α(1−δ)-approximate and ǫ-persuasive, which are precisely our desiderata. This concludes
the proof.
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